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INTRODUCTION
On July 27, 2012, a teenage girl named Alison Atkins passed away
from colon disease.' Her family turned to her online accounts for conso-
lation and answers.2 The family had to circumvent the teen's computer
password and use her computer's automatic log-in function to access
Alison's Twitter, Facebook, Tumblr, and email accounts.3 Alison's
online accounts contained conflicting characterizations of her life-
* Articles and Comments Editor, University of Miami Law Review; J.D. Candidate 2014,
University of Miami School of Law; B.S. 2009, University of Florida. This Note is dedicated to
my amazing and supportive husband, parents, family, and friends. A special thank you to
Professor Kunal Parker for his guidance throughout my work on this Note. I am also grateful to
Joshua Plager and the University of Miami Law Review for their feedback during the editing
process.
1. Geoffrey A. Fowler, Life and Death Online: Who Controls a Digital Legacy?, WALL ST.
J. (Jan. 5, 2013, 7:30 AM), available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014241278873246
77204578188220364231346.html. Although the Atkins case occurred in Canada, the issues
surrounding her digital estate are analogous to those facing American families.
2. Id.
3. Id.
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happy family pictures and dark, private journals.' Whether Alison
wanted her online life viewed after her death was unknown. Neverthe-
less, the family's control over these accounts was fleeting, as the
accounts eventually logged out or got deleted, and the contents were lost
forever.'
When Internet users die without planning for their digital lives,
families and estate executors are left to guess the users' wishes. Families
may violate terms of service agreements and battle with Internet service
providers to access digital property that the deceased never wanted
others to access. Discussing the Atkins family, journalist Geoffrey A.
Fowler wrote, "[T]aking hold of Alison Atkins's digital afterlife forced
her family to tread a line between celebrating her, and invading her pri-
vacy. In the process, her family discovered some dark journals Alison
clearly meant to conceal. 'She had passwords for a reason.' , 6
Handling digital assets after death presents numerous practical,
legal, and moral problems. Accounting for all of one's assets and round-
ing up the requisite passwords comprise the first step to managing a
digital estate.' Professors Gerry W. Beyer and Naomi Cahn suggest
drafting a separate document to supplement a will with log-in informa-
tion to protect the testator's privacy because probated wills become pub-
lic record.' Beyer and Cahn suggest designating how each asset should
be handled, such as which assets should be deleted and which ones
should be kept and by whom.9 This approach is helpful in accounting for
all of one's property, but it does not fully address how a family member
or personal representative of an estate can implement these wishes
legally.
This Note will explore the world of digital assets and how legisla-
tion can ensure the proper disposition of decedents' online selves. Part I
explores the different kinds of digital assets and how courts deal with
these assets in multiple types of litigation. Part II discusses the legisla-
tive solutions currently in place and under consideration for handling
digital assets at death. Part m analyzes the Proposed Uniform Fiduciary
Access to Digital Assets Act and discusses its innovations and shortfalls.
Part IV examines what types of control fiduciaries should be allowed to
4. Id
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See John Conner, Comment, Digital Life After Death: The Issue of Planning for a
Person's Digital Assets After Death, 3 EST. PLAN. & CommuNTrY PROP. L.J. 301, 315-18 (2011).
8. Gerry W. Beyer & Naomi Cahn, When You Pass on, Don't Leave the Passwords Behind:
Planning for Digital Assets, 26 PROB. & PRoP. 40, 42-43 (2012).
9. Id
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exercise over digital assets. Finally, this Note will conclude with recom-
mendations on how to best improve the Uniform Act.
I. DIGITAL ASSETS AS PROPERTY
A. Defining Digital Assets
Defining what constitutes a digital asset is no easy task. New
Internet uses are constantly created. Any definition of digital assets
needs to be broad enough to evolve with online innovation and clear
enough for lawyers, online service providers, and the general public to
understand what is included under the definition. A working definition
of a digital asset, in a general sense, is
a) information created, generated, sent, communicated, received, or
stored by electronic means on a digital device or system that delivers
digital information, and includes a contract right; and b) an electronic
system for creating, generating, sending, receiving, storing, display-
ing, or processing information which the account holder is entitled to
access.1o
Email and Facebook accounts are some of the more recognizable types
of property meeting this definition, but others include online bank
accounts, deleted blogs, dating profiles, and psychic reading transcripts.
Creating categories of property that meet the "digital assets" definition is
necessary for drafting comprehensive legislation that properly addresses
all digital assets. This author proposes dividing digital assets into four
categories: (1) Access Information, (2) Tangible Digital Assets, (3)
Intangible Digital Assets, and (4) Metadata.
(1) Access Information: Account numbers and log-in information
should be left to an executor to ensure an orderly distribution of digital
property. However, the access information is often separate from the
property it protects. Attorney David M. Lenz described access informa-
tion as not an "asset" in and of itself, but rather as a means to accessing
other assets." For example, a log-in password to an E-Trade account
makes accessing the underlying investments easier. Testators will
bequeath the investment itself, not the log-in information.
(2) Tangible Digital Assets: This category includes photographs,
PDFs, documents, emails, online savings account balances, domain
names, and blog posts. Tangible assets are not tangible in the physical
sense; they are compositions or property that hold a definable form.
10. UNi. FDuciRY ACCESS TO DIGITAL ASSETS Acr § 2 (Proposed Discussion Draft Oct.
22, 2013), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Fiduciary%20Access%20to%20
Digital%20Assets/2013novFADA Mtg Draft.pdf. See discussion infra Part III.
11. David M. Lenz, Death and Downloads: The Evolving Law of Fiduciary Access to Digital
Assets, 23 OHIO PROB. L.J. NL 2 (2012).
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These are likely files that can be named and transferred to another. Tan-
gible digital assets can likely be converted into physical assets, such as
printing a picture or receiving a check for the value of an online savings
account. These assets may have financial, cultural, or sentimental value,
and these assets will define the bulk of digital property that a deceased's
survivors will seek out.
(3) Intangible Digital Assets: This category is harder to conceptual-
ize than tangible digital assets. Intangible assets are "likes" on
Facebook, website profiles, and comments or reviews left on a blog.
Internet users can have intangible assets spread over cyberspace in
volumes. Testators may plan for pictures kept online but forget to plan
for the information posted on a dating profile. As more and more people
use the Internet and smartphones to conduct business and leisure activi-
ties, they leave a trail of thumbs up and thumbs down across cyberspace.
Intangible assets will likely need to be deleted or shut down.
(4) Metadata: Metadata consists of data electronically stored within
a document or website about the data's access history, location tags,
hidden text, author history, deleted data, code, and more. 12 Most web-
sites collect this information every time an Internet user clicks on a
link.1 3 These assets often leave a trail to every website a person visited
online. This last category builds off of the logic and problems with
intangible assets, except this type of information is even more obscure
and may not even be accessible to testators themselves. Metadata often
goes overlooked. While many survivors of a deceased loved one have no
interest in this type of information, it can be invaluable to others-such
as those trying to cope with a tragic death or those initiating wrongful
death litigation.
B. Digital Assets in Litigation
Reported case law on how these different types of digital assets are
accessed and distributed through the probate system is nearly nonexis-
tent at this time. However, it is helpful to consider discovery motions in
civil litigation to see a clearer picture of what kinds of digital property
exist in cyberspace and why people want this property. Many jurisdic-
tions now allow discovery of social networking websites in civil law-
suits.14 In Glazer v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co., a magistrate judge
12. See Joseph Capobianco & Gabrielle R. Schaich-Fardella, Electronic Age Changes in
Legal Practice, Which No Attorney Can Ignore, 84 N.Y. Sr. B.J. 30, 31 (2012).
13. For example, Yahoo!'s Privacy Policy provides that "Yahoo automatically receives and
records information from your computer and browser, including your IP address, Yahoo cookie
information, software and hardware attributes, and the page you request." Yahoo Privacy Policy,
YAHoo!, http://info.yahoo.com/privacy/us/yahoo/ (last updated May 31, 2013).
14. See, e.g., Ledbetter v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 06-CV-01958-WYD-MJW, 2009 WL
538 [Vol. 68:535
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ordered a plaintiff to turn over transcripts of her online conversations
with a psychic during discovery in an employment discrimination suit.1 5
In the probate context, a federal court ordered the estate of a woman
who died in an airplane crash to produce all of the deceased woman's
social media accounts, emails, text messages, and instant messages that
related to the decedent's domicile and the estate's loss of support
claims. 16
Parties seek metadata during discovery with increasing regularity,
particularly when the timetable of events is central to the dispute. It is
also sought when a party fears that another party "cleaned up" his online
presence and deleted digital information before it was requested in dis-
covery. In New York, a judge ordered a plaintiff to give the defendant
"access to [the p]laintiff s current and historical Facebook and MySpace
pages and accounts, including all deleted pages and related informa-
tion."" The defense won this extensive access after the public portions
of the plaintiffs Facebook and MySpace pages contained information
contradicting the plaintiff s personal injury claims.'" In a Delaware case,
a judge granted a motion to compel document requests in native format
with the original metadata when "the integrity of dates entered facially
on documents authorizing the award of stock options [was] at the heart
of the dispute." 9 In a New York copyright infringement suit, a judge
compelled production of all data showing when certain YouTube videos
were viewed.20
C. Which Digital Assets Are Worth Protecting at Death?
A major question remains after determining what digital assets are
floating out in cyberspace: Are these assets important and worth protect-
1067018, at *4 (D. Colo. Apr. 21, 2009), available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-
courts/colorado/codce/1:2006cv01958/98669/179 (denying motion for protective order to block
discovery of social networking sites because the request was "reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence as is relevant to the issues"); Largent v. Reed, No. 2009-1823,
2011 WL 5632688, at *13 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Nov. 8, 2011), available at http://www.theemployer
handbook.com/Largent.pdf (holding that no general privacy right exists to shield Facebook posts
from discovery). But see Keller v. Nat'l Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co., No. CV 12-72-M-DLC-
JCL, 2013 WL 27731, at *4-5 (D. Mont. Jan. 2, 2013) (limiting discovery to a list of social
networking sites subscribed to because the defendant did not provide evidence that the sites would
have information that undermined the plaintiffs' claims).
15. Glazer v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., No. 11 Civ. 4374(PGG)(FM), 2012 WL 1197167, at
*5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 2012).
16. In re Air Crash Near Clarence Ctr., N.Y., on Feb. 12, 2009, No. 09-CV-961S, 2011 WL
6370189, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2011). The deceased's domicile was important to the case, as
it determined whether Chinese or New Jersey law applied.
17. Romano v. Steelcase Inc., 907 N.Y.S.2d 650, 657 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010).
18. Id.
19. Ryan v. Gifford, No. 2213-CC, 2007 WL 4259557, at *1 (Del. Ch. Nov. 30, 2007).
20. Viacom Int'l Inc. v. Youtube Inc., 253 F.R.D. 256, 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
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ing at death? The answer is yes and no. Intangible digital assets should
not be viewed as property belonging to each individual testator unless a
contractual agreement says otherwise. We leave our footprints every-
where we go in the physical world. We sign guest books at museums
and hotels. We give our business cards to acquaintances at conferences.
We leave details with our dry cleaners on how we like our shirts pressed.
These little bits of personal information are left every place we go. Yet,
until now, we have not thought of that information as an asset belonging
to each individual. Guest books and rolodexes belong to the businesses
and people we leave them with. The problem with the online world is
that suddenly the Internet versions of this information, such as "likes"
and profiles, are all across the Web and are easily searchable and easily
disseminated.
The changing availability of these small bits of personal informa-
tion is creating a stir. However, ownership of the information should not
change just because it is more accessible. Many physical businesses that
offer services or products that are secretive and otherwise embarrassing
are likely under no legal obligation to protect that information in real
life. For example, hotels used for affairs or adult video stores likely keep
client information private for customer loyalty purposes and not because
they have a legal duty to not identify people who patronize their busi-
nesses. Intangible digital assets should be treated at death as client infor-
mation collected by physical businesses. Therefore, no statutory
protection should be required for these types of assets at death. Rather,
they should be available for access by subpoena as discussed above with
discovery litigation.
The only exception should be for metadata on one's own computer
and documents or log-in histories that the testator took steps to erase
during life. In the tangible world, unsent letters could be torn up and
discarded. But in the digital world, draft emails can never really be
erased forever. The line between metadata of personal deleted works and
metadata that belong to the recipient or business entity is a gray one.
However, as law on the relatively new concept of metadata evolves,
understanding how to handle it at death will evolve as well.
Tangible digital assets should be handled differently. These assets
can involve great sums of money and priceless cultural works. As these
assets are more definable, their potential value warrants statutory atten-
tion. It is worth state legislatures' time and energy to provide protection
for the ownership and use of testator's tangible digital assets after
death.2' Access information is the necessary key to tangible digital
21. See discussion infra Part IV and Conclusion (discussing the kinds of protections that
should be available for tangible digital assets).
[Vol. 68:535540
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assets, and it should be treated how keys to lock boxes and titles to cars
are treated in the physical world.
II. STATE STATUTES
Five states have enacted legislation specifically allowing personal
representatives to access certain types of a deceased's digital assets.22
Rhode Island's and Connecticut's statutes give executors access to or
copies of the contents of email accounts. 23 Idaho's and Oklahoma's stat-
utes allow for estates to "take control of, conduct, continue or terminate
any accounts of the decedent on any social networking website, any
microblogging or short message service website or any e-mail service
website."24 Nebraska has proposed similar legislation.25 Indiana's statute
does not specifically outline the types of online information subject to
the statute.26 Rather, it requires a custodian of electronically stored
information to provide the personal representative with access to or cop-
ies of "any documents or information of the deceased person stored elec-
tronically by the custodian." 27 This language is significantly broader
than the language in the other four enacted statutes and can likely grow
as the types of digital assets that decedents use grow.
In 2013, Oregon proposed legislation with even more progressive
language than any other enacted statute. Oregon proposes allowing
access, control, and disposal of "any digital assets and digital
accounts." 29 The proposed legislation requires a "custodian of digital
accounts and digital assets to transfer, deliver or provide access to
accounts or electronic copies of assets to [a] personal representative,
conservator or settlor upon written request."3 o If enacted, Oregon would
be the first state to use the term "digital assets" in a statutory context.
22. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-334a (2012); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-3-715(28) (2012); IND.
CODE § 29-1-13-1.1 (2012); OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, § 269 (2012); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-27-3 (2012).
23. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-334a; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-27-3.
24. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-3-715(28); OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, § 269.
25. L.B. 738, 102d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Neb. 2011).
26. IND. CODE § 29-1-13-1.1.
27. Id.
28. S.B. 54, §2(26) 77th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2013).
29. S.B. 54.
30. The above quote is a summary by the bill's editor. S.B. 54 provides as follows:
(13) "Digital accounts" includes, but is not limited to, electronic mail, financial,
personal and other online accounts.
(14) "Digital assets" includes, but is not limited to, text, images, multimedia
information or other property stored in a digital format, whether stored on a server,
computer or other physical device or in an electronic medium, regardless of the
ownership of the physical device or electronic medium in which the digital asset is
stored. "Digital assets" includes, but is not limited to, words, characters, codes or
contractual rights necessary to access the digital assets.
5412014]
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Two other states have enacted laws addressing issues with digital
assets in other contexts. Delaware allows an agent authorized under a
personal power of attorney to access communications and communicate
electronically on behalf of a living principal."' However, Delaware does
not have a similar statute that expressly authorizes such access to elec-
tronic communications after the principal's death. California has a stat-
ute requiring email service providers to provide a thirty-day notice to
users before permanently deleting their email accounts. 32 While this stat-
ute is not limited to accounts terminated upon the death of the account
holder, the statute helps notify and give time to surviving family mem-
bers of email account holders to take action and retrieve emails before
they are lost forever.
III. ANALYZING THE UNIFORm FIDUCIARY ACCESS
To DIGITAL ASSETS ACT
A. Applicability
The Uniform Law Commission, which produces the Uniform Pro-
bate Code and numerous other Model and Uniform laws, has been called
to guide the formulation of uniform state legislation to address the dis-
position of digital assets at death.3 3 On January 21, 2012, the Uniform
Law Commission's Executive Committee approved a resolution to form
a Study Committee to research the "need for and feasibility of state leg-
islation on fiduciary powers and authority to access digital informa-
tion."3 4 A Drafting Committee ("Committee") has since been formed,
and it released a discussion draft of a Proposed Uniform Fiduciary
Access to Digital Assets Act ("FADAA Draft") on January 18, 2013.11
The FADAA Draft was recently updated on October 22, 2013.36 The
current proposal is still in the drafting stage and will need to be submit-
ted for debate before the entire Uniform Law Commission at a minimum
31. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 49A-203(9) (2012).
32. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17538.35(a) (2012).
33. See Tyler G. Tarney, Comment, A Call for Legislation to Permit the Transfer of Digital
Assets at Death, 40 CAP. U. L. REV. 773, 797-98 (2012).
34. UNIF. LAW COMM'N, MINUTES OF THE MIDYEAR MEETING OF THE COMMITTEE ON SCOPE
AND PROGRAM 11 (Jan. 20, 2012), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/ shared/docs/scope/
ScopeMinutes_012012.pdf.
35. UNIF. FIDUCIARY AccEss To DIGITAL ASSETs AcT (Proposed Discussion Draft Jan. 18,
2013), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Fiduciary%20Access%20to%20Digi
tal%20Assets/2013janl8_FADAMtgDraft.pdf.
36. UNIP. FIDUCIARY ACCESS To DIGrrAL ASSErs Acr (Proposed Discussion Draft Oct. 22,
2013), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Fiduciary%2Access%20to%2ODigi
tal%20Assets/2013novFADAMtgDraft.pdf.
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of two annual meetings once complete. It then must be approved by
the Committee of the Whole, and a minimum of twenty states must
approve the Act before it becomes an official Uniform Act. Once an
official Uniform Act, individual states must choose to enact the statute
wholly or partially. Thus, the draft is a long way from becoming binding
authority, but it provides a helpful model for other states looking to draft
their own legislation. It also provides a much more comprehensive look
into the statutory and implementation issues of statutes handling digital
property than any of the state laws currently in effect.3 9
The FADAA Draft seeks to "vest fiduciaries with the authority to
access, manage, distribute, copy or delete digital assets and accounts."4 0
The draft expands beyond personal representatives to conservators,
agents acting under a power of attorney, and trustees.4 The multiple
types of fiduciaries covered under the Act are logical and more effi-
ciently address all of these fiduciary interests at once.
The first major component of the FADAA Draft is the definitions
of the terms used within it.42 As many of these terms have never before
been defined in any statutes, the Committee must carefully craft defini-
tions without much guidance. The Committee must specifically make its
definitions comply with federal and state laws dealing with unauthorized
access to digital information. The Stored Communications Act
("SCA") makes it a crime for anyone to intentionally access electronic
communications without proper authorization." The punishment for
individuals who violate the SCA can be up to five years imprisonment
37. ULC Drafting Process, UNIF. LAW COMM'N, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Narrative.aspx?
title=ULC%20Drafting%2OProcess (last visited Dec. 29, 2013).
38. Id.
39. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-334a (2012); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-3-715(28) (2012);
IND. CODE § 29-1-13-1.1 (2012); OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, § 269 (2012); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-27-3
(2012).
40. UNIF. FIDUCIARY ACCESS TO DIGITAL ASSETS ACT prefatory note (Proposed Discussion
Draft Oct. 22, 2013).
41. Id.
42. Id. § 2.
43. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2711 (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012). For a compilation of
state unauthorized access laws, see Computerized Hacking and Unauthorized Access Laws, NAT'L
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (May 21, 2009), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/
telecom/computer-hacking-and-unauthorized-access-laws.aspx, noted in UNIF. FIDUCIARY ACCESS
To DIGITAL ASSETS ACT § 8 cmt.
44. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) reads as follows:
(a) Offense.-Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section whoever-
(1) intentionally accesses without authorization a facility through which an
electronic communication service is provided; or
(2) intentionally exceeds an authorization to access that facility;
and thereby obtains, alters, or prevents authorized access to a wire or electronic
communication while it is in electronic storage in such system shall be punished as
provided in subsection (b) of this section.
2014] 543
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and fines.4 5 Under 18 U.S.C. § 2702, custodians of information are pro-
hibited from releasing online communications without proper authoriza-
tion.4 6 Electronic communication custodians are included under the SCA
if they function as an electronic communication service ("ECS") or a
remote computing service ("RCS").47 A provider falls under ECS if it
allows users to send or receive wire or electronic communications,4 8 and
it falls under RCS if it provides "computer storage or processing ser-
vices by means of an electronic communications system." 4 9 This distinc-
tion is important because it determines what level of privacy is attached
to that communication. 0 Whether an online service provider like
Facebook falls under the SCA and is exposed to liability for unautho-
rized disclosures differs based on the particular type of communication
disclosed and whether it is deemed an ECS or RCS provider. ECS and
RCS providers can disclose protected communications with "lawful
consent.""
The case law on which websites and providers are or are not cov-
ered under the SCA is just now developing. A United States district
court in California held that private messaging through a webmail ser-
vice or through a social networking site falls under the protection of the
SCA.52 Twitter has also been held to be an electronic communication
45. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(b)(2).
46. Id. § 2702.
47. 18 U.S.C. § 2702 reads as follows:
(a) Prohibitions.-Except as provided in subsection (b) or (c)-
(1) a person or entity providing an electronic communication service to the public
shall not knowingly divulge to any person or entity the contents of a communication
while in electronic storage by that service; and
(2) a person or entity providing remote computing service to the public shall not
knowingly divulge to any person or entity the contents of any communication which
is carried or maintained on that service-
(A) on behalf of, and received by means of electronic transmission from (or created
by means of computer processing of communications received by means of
electronic transmission from), a subscriber or customer of such service;
(B) solely for the purpose of providing storage or computer processing services to
such subscriber or customer, if the provider is not authorized to access the contents
of any such communications for purposes of providing any services other than
storage or computer processing; .
48. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (2012).
49. Id. § 2711(2).
50. For a more comprehensive analysis of the SCA and the distinctions between ECS and
RCS, see Allen D. Hankins, Compelling Disclosure of Facebook Content Under the Stored
Communications Act, 17 SUFFOLK J. TRMAL & App. Aovoc. 295, 299-300 (2012).
51. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(3) (2012).
52. Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 980 (C.D. Cal. 2010); see also In
Re Request for Order Requiring Facebook, Inc. to Produce Documents and Things, No. C 12-
80171 LHK (PSG) (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2012), available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/
district-courts/california/candce/5:2012mc80171/257305/2210.pdf?ts=1348220335 (quashing a
544 [Vol. 68:535
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provider under the SCA. 5 1 Other rulings have been less clear-cut. Some
cases turn on subtle distinctions based on how digital information was
stored or what types of privacy settings were attached to the data. In
New York, YouTube videos saved as private were protected under the
SCA, but public videos later removed were not.5 4 The Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit held that email messages stored on a server were
protected under the SCA. 5 In South Carolina, a court ruled, "[w]e
decline to hold that retaining an opened email [that was not downloaded
or otherwise saved] constitutes storing it for backup protection under the
[Stored Communications] Act."56
The complexities of the SCA may make Internet service providers
wary to release information. Both individual fiduciaries and service
providers are dancing around the contours of the SCA's provisions in
order to avoid any liability for violating the SCA. 18 U.S.C. § 2702
allows disclosure "with the lawful consent of the originator or an
addressee or intended recipient of such communication, or the subscriber
in the case of remote computing service."5 This language does not spe-
cifically provide for consent given by a fiduciary or assignee. Thus, the
language proposed in the FADAA Draft must be specifically written to
address compliance with the SCA and other unauthorized access
laws.58' 59 In order to ensure compliance, the Committee drafted its fidu-
ciary authority section to mirror the language of the SCA and maintain
that fiduciaries have the same authority to access information as the
originator or account holder.60
Section Three of the FADAA Draft limits the Act's applicability to
grants of authority given to a fiduciary. 61 The cases of family members
fighting for access to emails of deceased loved ones that have made
headlines in recent years62 would not be covered under this Act because
subpoena for Facebook records requested by a family seeking information to prove that its
daughter did not commit suicide because the subpoena violated the SCA).
53. People v. Harris, 945 N.Y.S.2d 505, 511 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2012).
54. Viacom Int'l Inc. v. Youtube Inc., 253 F.R.D. 256, 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
55. Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1075 (9th Cir. 2004).
56. Jennings v. Jennings, 736 S.E.2d 242, 245 (S.C. 2012).
57. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(3) (2012).
58. UNIF. FIDUCIARY ACCESS To DIGITAL ASSETs ACT § 4(a)(3). (Proposed Discussion Draft
Oct. 22, 2013), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Fiduciary%20Access%20to
%20Digital%2OAssets/2013novFADAMtgDraft.pdf.
59. For example, fiduciaries also have to contend with the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,
which prohibits intentional unauthorized access to computers. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2) (2012).
60. UNIF. FIDUCIARY AccESS To DIGYTAL ASSETs ACT § 8(a), 8 cmt.
61. Id. § 3.
62. See, e.g., Michael Avok, States Tackle Legislation Giving Kin of Dead Facebook Users
Access to Digital Legacies, DENVER POST (Mar. 16, 2012, 2:52 AM), http://www.denverpost.com/
business/ci_20185040/states-tackle-legislation-giving-kin-dead-facebook-users; Jessica Hopper,
Digital Afterlife: What Happens to Your Online Accounts When You Die?, ROCK CENTER (June 1,
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"their efforts are subject to other laws."6 It is unclear what "other laws"
the Committee refers to here. All the state statutes currently in effect on
the issue also give access of covered digital property only to an executor
or administrator of an estate." This creates certain practical issues for
families seeking prized emails, photos, or documents of loved ones. A
will likely needs to specifically give access to family members, and the
will needs to be probated to grant the authority to a personal representa-
tive to access digital property. For example, a young man who dies
unexpectedly may have no assets to probate. If the young man's parents
want to access his pictures on Facebook, under a plain reading of this
Act, the parents would have to engage in court proceedings first.65
Requiring a formal estate to be established also creates problems
for those with claims against a decedent's digital property. In Davis v.
Google, a blogger posted an allegedly defamatory statement about the
mother of a famous speed skater.66 The blogger then passed away, and
he had no estate against which Davis could seek relief.67 Davis had to
seek a court order compelling Google, the host company of the blog, to
take down the post, but Google claimed that it did not have control over
customers' posts.68 This unfortunate situation would not be resolved by
the current FADAA Draft because a fiduciary needs a grant of authority
recognized by the Act for the blog post to be taken down. The Davis
case highlights an important point: Legislation to address the disposition
of digital property will only work if wills are made and estates are pro-
bated. This leaves a gaping hole in the resolution of the digital assets
conundrum.
B. Establishing Authority
The central purpose of the FADAA Draft is to vest authority in
fiduciaries to control digital property.69 There are two main concepts in
this goal that require analysis: how to get the authority and how to exer-
2012, 10:53 AM), http://rockcenter.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/06/01/11995859-digital-afterlife-
what-happens-to-your-online-accounts-when-you-die.
63. UNi'. FIDUCIARY ACCESS To DIGITAL ASSETS ACT § 3 cmt ("Family members or friends
may seek such access, but, unless they are fiduciaries, their efforts are subject to other laws and
are not covered by this act.").
64. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-334a (2012); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-3-715(28) (2012); IND.
CODE § 29-1-13-1.1 (2012); OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, § 269 (2012); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-27-3 (2012).
65. See Hopper, supra note 62.
66. Complaint at 9H 4-6, Davis v. Google, Inc., No. 09CH 15753 2009, 2009 WL 995128 (il.
Cir. Apr. 9, 2009), available at http://www.courthousenews.com/2009/04/13/DavisvGoogle.pdf.
67. Id. at 10.
68. Id. at 7.
69. UNIF. FIDUCIARY ACCESS To DIGYTAL ASSETs Acr prefatory note (Proposed Discussion
Draft Oct. 22, 2013), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Fiduciary%2OAccess
%20to%20Digital%20Assets/2013novFADAMtgDraft.pdf.
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cise that authority. In Part IV, this Note will discuss in detail what
actions fall under the definition of "exercise control." Here, this Note
will discuss the procedural and technical issues that surround the process
of obtaining the authority to control digital property.
i. COURT ORDER REQUIREMENTS
Section Four of the FADAA Draft reads:
(a) Unless prohibited by the will of the decedent, a court, or law of
this state other than this [Act], a personal representative of the dece-
dent may obtain:
(1) the digital assets of a decedent;
(2) records of the electronic communications of the decedent
controlled by an electronic communication service or a remote com-
puting service, including a log of the electronic address of each party
with whom the decedent communicated; and
(3) the contents of each electronic communication controlled by
an electronic communication service or a remote computing service
sent or received by the decedent, to the extent consistent with 18
U.S.C. Section 2702(b).
The FADAA Draft modeled this section after the Uniform Probate
Code's definition of a personal representative's default powers.70
Whether fiduciary access to digital property should be a default
power or whether it should require a court order to exercise such author-
ity is still being debated by the Drafting Committee.7 1 Making a per-
sonal representative's control over digital property a default power
would be a huge shift in the disposition of digital property. If the
FADAA Draft were to require court authorization and not be a default
power the requirement may create some practical consequences, as not
all wills go through a formal probate proceeding. Non-judicial officers,
such as court clerks, appoint many personal representatives.7 2 Some
jurisdictions sign generic form letters of appointment for personal repre-
sentatives.73 The language in these forms will have to be changed to
accommodate this requirement. Otherwise, families seeking to probate
small estates will have to open more formal proceedings to get the
authorization to dispose of digital property.
Personal representative authority over digital assets is limited by
70. See UNW. PROBATE CODE §§ 3-715, 3-703 (amended 2010).
71. UNru. FiDucLARY ACCESS To DIGITAL ASSETS ACT § 4 cmt. (Proposed Discussion Draft
Jan. 18, 2013), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Fiduciary%20Access%20to
%20Digital%20Assets/2013janl8_FADAMtgDraft.pdf.
72. Id.
73. See, e.g., Informal Probate: Application for Appointment as Personal Representative,
SUPERIOR CT. ARIz. MARICOPA CPTY., available at http://www.superiorcourt.maricopa.gov/ssc
Docs/packets/pbiplf.pdf.
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the clause that reads "[u]nless prohibited by the will of the decedent, a
court, or law of this state other than this [act] ... ."7 This clause raises
countless questions. What kinds of testamentary language will suffice to
direct or limit the exercise of this control? What level of specificity is
needed to restrict control? If the will is silent on the disposition of digital
property, is a personal representative required to access or give the prop-
erty to a residuary beneficiary? Will a new form of boilerplate that
grants authority over all digital property without any specification as to
specific accounts and assets suffice? Is a blanket rejection of authority
over digital assets adequate? And if it is, what happens to this property?
If a testator provides in his will that the executor is to have no
authority to access his digital assets, then the testator's estate will not be
properly resolved. Testators cannot deny their executors authority to dis-
pose of real property. Such a provision would cloud titles and create
efficiency problems. The difference between many types of digital assets
and real property is that some digital assets dispose of themselves over
time. Many websites shut down accounts after periods of inactivity.
But other digital assets, such as money in online trading or savings
accounts, will end up being abandoned if an executor cannot liquidate
the accounts.
Imagine a simple will, where the testator leaves all of his stock and
investments to his sister but specifically denies authority to his executor
to access his digital accounts. If the testator had $5,000 worth of stock
accessible through a traditional broker and $100,000 worth of stock kept
in an E-Trade account, will the sister only inherit the $5,000? In such a
scenario, litigation will likely ensue over the $100,000 worth of stock.
Courts in cases such as this may override blanket rejections of authority.
Otherwise, the real value of estates may be reduced and countless assets
abandoned that would not normally be lost. At a minimum, this section
of the FADAA Draft shows how critical it is for estate planners to work
with their clients to create detailed and precise instructions for the distri-
bution of digital assets. The provision also suggests that attorneys must
specifically address the need for a court order with explicit authority
over digital property.
74. Uim. FimucIRY AccEss To DIGrrAL AssErs Act § 4(a) (Proposed Discussion Draft Oct.
22, 2013), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Fiduciary%20Access%20to%20
Digital%20Assets/2013novFADAMtg-Draft.pdf.
75. See, e.g., Inactive Account Policy, TwrrrER, https://support.twitter.com/articles/15362-
inactive-account-policy ("To keep your account active, be sure to log in and Tweet (i.e., post an
update) within 6 months of your last update. Accounts may be permanently removed due to
prolonged inactivity.") (last visited Dec. 29, 2013); Terms of Service, AOL, http://legal.aol.com/
terms-of-service/full-terns/ (last updated Apr. 19, 2013) ("Your username and account may be
terminated if you do not sign on a Service with your username at least once every 90 days.").
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ii. TERMS OF SERVICE
A personal representative can exercise control over a decedent's
digital property in accordance with "any applicable and enforceable
terms of service agreement."7 6 This provision unfortunately requires us
to look into every website's terms of service, terms of use, or privacy
policy agreement to know what kinds of rights are available for a per-
sonal representative to control. Terms of service agreements that pop up
on a website and require users to click "Agree" or "Continue" to access
the website's content are called clickwrap or shrinkwrap agreements."
These agreements are generally upheld in court, so they will proscribe
the testamentary options for digital assets." If the clickwrap agreement
includes terms creating a non-transferable license, as iTunes' does,79 no
asset is available to pass down. If the terms provide for user ownership
of data, then subsequent terms must be analyzed to find the website's
procedure for transfer of ownership.o If the website's terms of service
do not address assignability and survivorship, then personal representa-
tives will have to fight for access to that data on a case-by-case basis. 1
The vast variations among these agreements in terms of assignabil-
ity and ownership of online content reflect the various goals of Internet
companies. Some companies limit transferability and assignability to
protect the rights of their users,8 2 while others limit user privacy and
ownership rights in order to gather their users' information and content
for advertising revenue purposes.83 Facebook recently agreed to a $20-
million settlement for marketing users' pictures and information to sell
76. UN. FmucIARY AccEss To DIGrrAL ASSETs ACT § 8(b).
77. Cheryl B. Preston & Eli W. McCann, Unwrapping Shrinkwraps, Clickwraps, and
Browsewraps: How the Law Went Wrong from Horse Traders to the Law of the Horse, 26 BYU J.
PUB. L. 1, 17-18 (2011).
78. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Shrinkwrap licenses are
enforceable unless their terms are objectionable on grounds applicable to contracts in
general. . . ."). For an in-depth analysis of judicial enforcement of these agreements, see Preston &
McCann, supra note 77.
79. Terms and Conditions, APPLE, http://www.apple.comlegallitunes/us/terms.html#SERV
ICE (last updated Sept. 18, 2013).
80. See, e.g., How Do I Close the PayPal Account of a Relative?, PAYPAL, https://www.pay
pal.com/ca/webapps/helpcenter/article/?solutionId=1205004&m=SRE (last visited Oct. 20, 2013).
PayPal requires executors to send it the decedent's death certificate and will or executor
documentation. PayPal will issue a check in the account holder's name, if approved.
81. See, e.g., Terms of Service, YELP, http://www.yelp.com/static?country_=US&p=tos (last
updated Nov. 27, 2012) (providing that users own their own content without including an
assignability provision).
82. See infra text accompanying notes 86-91.
83. Privacy Policy, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/policies/privacy/ (last modified Dec. 20,
2013) (providing that Google collects user information to "offer you tailored content-like giving
you more relevant search results and ads").
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its "Sponsored Stories" without user consent. 84 The settlement has lim-
ited how companies can use one's data in one respect, but it also shows
how companies are getting increasingly creative in how they can limit
user privacy and ownership in order to raise profits.
Internet users are becoming more acutely aware of their legal rights
and what they are finding in their terms of service agreements. In
December 2012, a public outcry erupted after Instagram announced a
new terms of service and privacy policy that would have given advertis-
ers free use of Instagram users' photographs without compensating the
photographers. Within days, Instagram backtracked and revised its
policy changes." Instagram's CEO posted a message on its site apolo-
gizing and affirming that "Instagram has no intention of selling your
photos, and we never did. We don't own your photos-you do."8 While
this public relations nightmare made headlines, it highlights an instance
of consumers actually reading and responding to what happens to their
digital property.
Instagram's policy change outraged users for its encroachment on
users' property rights, but other policies have been criticized for being
too protective. For example, Yahoo! terminates all user rights upon the
user's death. 8 When Yahoo! initially refused to release emails to the
family of a fallen Marine, the public took notice." Yahoo! argued that
its policy was in place to protect its users' privacy.90 Yahoo! eventually
gave the family access, but it refused to change its policy."
As more terms of service are litigated, restrictive policies may
84. Notice of Class Action and Proposed Settlement, Fraley v. Facebook, No. CV- 1l-0 1726
RS (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2012), available at http:// docs.fraleyfacebooksettlement.com/docs/notice
.pdf; see also Somini Sengupta, F.T.C. Settles Privacy Issue at Facebook, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30,
2011, at B I (regarding a separate settlement between Facebook and the Federal Trade
Commission due to unfair and deceptive use of user's personal information).
85. Jonathan Weber & Dan Levine, Instagram Retreats on New Service Terms Following
Backlash, REUTERS (Dec. 21, 2012), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/21/us-
usa-instagram-changes-idUSBRE8BKO3K20121221.
86. Id.
87. Kevin Systrom, Updated Terms of Service Based on Your Feedback, INSTAGRAM, http://
blog.instagram.com/post/38421250999/updated-terms-of-service-based-on-your-feedback (last
visited Dec. 29, 2013).
88. Yahoo! Terms of Service, YAHoo!, http://info.yahoo.comlegallus/yahoo/utos/utos-173
.html (last updated Mar. 16, 2012) ("You agree that your Yahoo! account is non-transferable and
any rights to your Yahoo! ID or contents within your account terminate upon your death.").
89. Jim Hu, Yahoo Denies Family Access to Dead Marine's E-mail, CNET (Dec. 21, 2004,
2:49PM), http://news.cnet.com/Yahoo-denies-family-access-to-dead-marines-e-mail/2100-1038
3-5500057.html.
90. Id.
91. Stefanie Olsen, Yahoo Releases E-mail of Deceased Marine, CNET (Apr. 21, 2005, 12:39
PM), http://news.cnet.com/Yahoo-releases-e-mail-of-deceased-marine/2100-1038_3-5680025
.html.
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receive more scrutiny in the future. States enacting more uniform stat-
utes that provide clear procedures for access to deceased users' accounts
may allow online service providers to create more workable and user-
friendly terms of service and privacy policies. But it will likely be public
demand and responses like in the Instagram case that will force online
service providers to better craft their terms to give more rights and dis-
position options to their users.
iii. CONSERVATORS, AGENTS, AND TRUSTEES
The FADAA Draft addresses digital property control by trustees,
conservators, and agents under a power of attorney. 9 2 A trustee's author-
ity is governed by the terms of the trust instrument.93 The FADAA Draft
trust provision needs to be expounded upon. Attorneys drafting trust
instruments need guidance as to what language is needed to confer digi-
tal asset control in a trustee. They also need to know what limits can be
put on that control. For example, there may be different requirements
necessary to establish control of digital assets in testamentary and inter
vivos trusts.
A conservator can obtain access to digital assets and electronic
communications of a protected person after a hearing.94 After they
obtain access, conservators can "manage, deactivate, and delete" any of
this information just as a personal representative of a decedent can. A
person acting under a power of attorney can also "access, manage, deac-
tivate, and delete" digital information if the power of attorney docu-
ments grant the agent such authority.96 This section was modeled after
Uniform Probate Code § 5B-201(a), which outlines certain actions that
require a specific grant of authority for a power of attorney to act.9
Failure to gain express authority to handle digital assets could expose
agents and conservators to liability under the SCA or other unauthorized
92. UNIF. FIDUCIARY ACCESS To DiGrrAL ASSETS ACT §§ 5-7 (Proposed Discussion Draft
Oct. 22, 2013), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Fiduciary%20Access%20to
%20Digital%20Assets/2013nov FADA_- MtgDraft.pdf.
93. Id. § 7 ("A trustee may access, manage, deactivate, and delete the digital assets and
electronic communications held in the trust in accordance with the terms of the trust expressly
authorizing the trustee to exercise these powers.").
94. Id. § 5.
95. Id. §§ 5(c)(4), 4(b). Section Six uses the same language as it relates to a "principal,"
rather than a "protected person."
96. Id. § 6.
97. UNwr. PROBATE CODE § 5B-201 reads as follows:
(a) An agent under a power of attorney may do the following on behalf of the
principal or with the principal's property only if the power of attorney expressly
grants the agent the authority and exercise of the authority is not otherwise
prohibited by another agreement or instrument to which the authority or property is
subject . ...
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access laws.98 Therefore, persons subjecting themselves or being sub-
jected to conservatorships or power of attorney arrangements will need
to explicitly outline what types of authority they wish to grant to an
agent or conservator in the instruments governing those situations.
iv. RECOVERY FROM A CUSTODIAN
Recovering digital property from the custodian in possession of it is
the next major hurdle for fiduciaries. Section Nine of the FADAA Draft
provides a procedure for fiduciaries to recover digital property. 9
Fiduciaries must send a written request accompanied by certified copies
of the applicable documentation granting that fiduciary control over the
digital property. 0 The Act gives a custodian sixty days to comply, and
a court order directing compliance can be requested after sixty days.101
Custodian compliance with written requests and court orders will
determine the effectiveness of the Act. Section Ten of the FADAA Draft
provides that a custodian acting in compliance with the Act is immune
from liability. 102 Currently, online providers are not liable for disclosure
violations of the SCA if done in good faith based on a court order,103 but
many service providers are still reluctant to turn over the information. i
If the FADAA Draft or a similar law were widely enacted, custodians of
electronic communications and property may be more assured that their
release of property is lawful and may comply with written requests more
consistently.
However, practical issues may arise with getting custodian compli-
ance within sixty days. With certain sites having hundreds of millions of
98. See discussion supra Part IH.A.
99. UNIF. FIDucIARY ACCESS To DIGrrAL ASSETS AcT § 9.
100. Id. § 9(b). If the fiduciary is a personal representative, a written request must be
accompanied by a certified copy of the letter of appointment of the representative; if requested by
a conservator, a certified copy of the court order giving the conservator authority of the digital
property is needed; if requested by an agent, a certified copy of the power of attorney authorizing
authority is needed; and if requested by a trustee, a certified copy of the trust instrument giving
authority is required. Id.
101. Id. § 9(c).
102. Id. § 10.
103. 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2012) reads as follows:
(e) No cause of action against a provider disclosing information under this
chapter.-No cause of action shall lie in any court against any provider of wire or
electronic communication service, its officers, employees, agents, or other specified
persons for providing information, facilities, or assistance in accordance with the
terms of a court order, warrant, subpoena, statutory authorization, or certification
under this chapter.
104. See, e.g., In Re Request for Order Requiring Facebook, Inc. to Produce Documents and
Things, No. C 12-80171 LHK (PSG), at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2012), available at http://docs
.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/califomia/candce/5:2012mc80171/257305/22/0.pdf?ts=13
48220335.
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users, custodians will likely need more support staff to handle all the
requests. Companies may develop software that can process digital asset
requests electronically, but new innovations entail development and
implementation expenses. Staffing and logistical problems will likely be
a barrier to getting companies to enact more favorable terms of service.
Companies will want to eliminate the responsibility and expense of
handling these requests.
IV. EXERCISING CONTROL
A. Control
After fiduciaries gain authority over digital property and systems
are put in place for fiduciaries to retrieve the property from custodians,
the last major question is: What kinds of actions are included under a
fiduciary's ability to "access, manage, deactivate, and delete" digital
property? The FADAA Draft needs a clear definition of these four terms
in order to avoid unnecessary litigation. Fiduciaries will commonly
request access to digital property to retrieve it and turn it over to a par-
ticular beneficiary or to delete said property. Whether certain types of
assets can be devised or deleted should be spelled out in the statute.
Complex distribution schemes such as devises with use restrictions will
also need to be addressed in the statute. As new types of digital property
are created, new creative ways of passing it on will inevitably appear.
While the FADAA Draft cannot address all possible distribution
schemes, limiting the number of case-by-case determinations on the
enforceability of different testamentary provisions will increase the
Act's success. Uniformity in how digital property is handled is key to
getting custodians of digital property to release the property consistently
and with less court involvement.
B. Objections
The January 2013 version of the FADAA Draft allowed interested
parties to object to a fiduciary's control or continued control of a dece-
dent's digital property.1o5 However, the October 2013 version deleted
this provision.106 The ability of family members or interested parties to
object should be protected. Many types of digital assets are extremely
personal, and ownership of the assets may be unclear. It is helpful to
105. UNiF. FIDucIARY ACCESS To DIoGTAL ASSETS ACT § 9 (Proposed Discussion Draft Jan.
18, 2013), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Fiduciary%20Access%20to%20
Digital%20Assets/2013janl8_FADAMtgDraft.pdf.
106. UNIF. FiDuciARY ACCESS To DIGrrAL ASSETS ACT (Proposed Discussion Draft Oct. 22,
2013), available at http://www.unifornlaws.org/shared/docs/Fiduciary%20Access%20to%20Digi
tal%20Assets/2013novFADAMtgDraft.pdf.
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look for clues to the meaning of "access, manage, deactivate, and
delete"'0 7 through the objections that interested parties may raise to
challenge such control.
i. ASSIGNING AN ASSET TO A PARTICULAR BENEFICIARY
The first and most common bequest of digital property will likely
be to give a specific digital asset to a particular beneficiary. Objections
to outright gifts of digital property may resemble objections to a bequest
of a family ring, such as improper execution, duress, or undue influence.
These objections should apply to all digital assets in the same way,
whether that asset is tangible, intangible, or metadata. Objections to out-
right gifts will likely not be objections to the digital or intangible nature
of the asset, but rather objections to the beneficiary receiving it. There-
fore, all digital assets should be devisable to a particular beneficiary (or
group of beneficiaries, where feasible).
ii. ORDERING DELETION OF DIGITAL ASSETS
Testators may order executors of their estates to delete a particular
asset or all of their digital assets. It is easy to imagine a grieving family
challenging such requests in court. Deletion of online data will likely be
one of the most objected-to exercises of a fiduciary's control of a digital
estate. Common law principles against waste and destruction of property
do not exactly fit with digital asset concepts, yet they likely still apply in
certain situations. Therefore, the FADAA Draft's definitions of "access,
manage, deactivate, and delete" should specifically address what types
of digital assets should be allowed to be deleted or whether the eco-
nomic waste doctrine applies.
As discussed in Part I, different categories of digital assets serve
different purposes and carry with them different monetary, cultural, and
sentimental values. Therefore, it is important to apply the public policy
against waste to each category separately. The first type of assets, access
information, is a means to access other assets. These assets can very
easily be taken to the grave if not written down or told to another person.
This information can likely be equated to hiding the key to a safety
deposit box or never writing down the combination to a safe. Therefore,
a will provision ordering the deletion of a password or account number
will likely not affect the testator's desired result. This situation would be
like a testator ordering the destruction of the keys to his house, but this
move will not stop someone from inheriting the house and changing the
locks. Thus, practically speaking, access information should be allowed
to be deleted, but such a move may not actually delete the information
107. UNIm. FIDucIARY AccEss To DIGITAL AssETs Acr § 4(b).
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within that account. Therefore, estate planners should not order account
numbers and passwords to be deleted without ordering the assets that
they guard to be deleted as well. Courts should allow interference with
deletion of access information only if the testator willed property hidden
behind that information to another. For example, a court may order an
executor to use the access information to retrieve family pictures
bequeathed to a beneficiary and then to delete the access information
after the retrieval.
Testators should always be allowed to order metadata within their
control to be deleted. Imagine a testator who exchanges emails with a
mistress. He deletes the account and all record of the emails off of his
computer. Yet, the deleted emails were backed up by the email provider
and can be retrieved. The testator took all the steps he could during life
to "destroy" this property, but the form of the website did not actually
permanently destroy the property. This situation should be the
equivalent of shredding torrid love letters, but instead it is the equivalent
of keeping copies of the letters in the basement.
As discussed in Part I, most metadata and intangible digital assets
should be deemed the property of the website or online business that
hosts it. Therefore, a testator can only order deletion of that asset at
death if the individual online host gives that power to the testator in its
terms of service or other policies.
Tangible assets present the best case for applying the economic
waste doctrine, but the doctrine should still be limited to assets of pure
financial value or online businesses. Tangible digital assets such as pic-
tures, music compositions, documents, and domain names can have
great sentimental or monetary value. With so much business being con-
ducted online, deleting data can lead to the loss of a revenue stream.
For many artists, computers are now the canvases, diaries, and
sketch books of yore. Thus, a clear comparison can be made between
artists wanting to destroy their unpublished creations and Internet users
wanting to destroy their unpublished digital compositions and writ-
ings."o Historically, many of these assets kept in physical files and
drawers have been barred from destruction. Yet, many artists and nota-
ble people have tried to order the destruction of their works at death.
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz recounts that multiple American presidents have
ordered destruction of their presidential papers after their deaths. 109
Franz Kafka ordered the executor of his estate to burn all of his writ-
ings.' 10 In some of these cases, executors have refused to follow the
108. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781, 830 (2005).
109. Id. at 812.
110. Id. at 830-31.
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testator's wishes on their own. In other situations, courts and Congress
have stepped in to stop such destruction. In response to Nixon's destruc-
tion of papers relating to the Watergate scandal, Congress enacted the
Presidential Records Act after Nixon's death that took away private
ownership of presidential papers.
Strahilevitz argues that we should defer to a testator's testamentary
wishes when it comes to cultural property, even if that property also has
a high monetary value." 2 His rationale is based on First Amendment
issues and the rights of artists to define their own legacies and limit the
release of "inferior works.""' He further argues that if testamentary
destruction is not allowed, destroying the property during life or willing
the property to a company that will then destroy the property for the
testator could circumvent the rule."4 Strahilevitz's views demonstrate
the balancing act that must be struck between privacy and freedom of
testamentary disposition and waste of culturally and monetarily valuable
property. Strahilevitz's views should be codified for personal digital
property, even if the property has great cultural or financial value. Testa-
tors should have control over how they wish to leave their artistic legacy
or, more simply, how they wish to leave their reputation among their
family and friends.
Some digital assets are not personal compositions and take a purely
financial or business form. Many blogs generate revenue from advertise-
ments displayed on the site. If a testator directs his executor to delete the
blog, the testator's heirs or other beneficiaries lose out on potential reve-
nues. Destroying a blog can be seen as destroying the use of one's per-
sona online, and such may be allowed under many states' right to
publicity laws.I" Right to publicity laws control the commercial use of a
person's persona after his death.1 6 Professor William A. Drennan, in
discussing the ability of a celebrity to limit all commercial use of his
persona after death, made the following analogy:
[I]f a top celebrity enjoys the fruits of the commercial exploitation of
her image until death, a direction in her will that her right of publicity
can never be exploited would be comparable to allowing an individ-
ual to enjoy the interest and dividends from millions of dollars
throughout her life, and then enforce a direction in her will to burn
111. Id. at 813.
112. Id. at 835.
113. Id. at 833.
114. Id. at 838.
115. William A. Drennan, Wills, Trusts, Schadenfreude, and the Wild, Wacky Right of
Publicity: Exploring the Enforceability of Dead-Hand Restrictions, 58 ARK. L. REv. 43, 47, 141
(2005) (including compilation of state right to publicity laws).
116. Id. at 47.
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the millions or hurl the millions into the sea." 7
Drennan's argument parallels the problematic consequences of allowing
testators to order the destruction of their financially profitable online
businesses at death. They are in effect "hurling millions into the sea."
Therefore, this author argues that testators cannot order the deletion of
purely financial assets and online businesses earning revenue streams.
Online savings accounts, online gambling accounts, and any other online
accounts containing liquid assets should not be deleted without liquidat-
ing the cash value of the account and bequeathing it to a beneficiary
first. The FADAA Draft should not allow an executor to delete blogs or
websites with revenue streams at the testator's request if the court deter-
mines that the digital asset is the equivalent of a business. Distinguish-
ing the line between personal digital property and a digital business may
cause some court disputes in close cases, but including the distinction in
the FADAA Draft will limit the number of deletion provisions that have
to be decided on a case-by-case basis in clearer cases.
iii. IMPLEMENTING USE RESTRICTIONS
As testators become more aware of their online assets and attorneys
do more strategic estate planning with these assets, more creativity will
arise in digital asset testamentary schemes. Creative testators may start
to use other types of dispositions that less resemble fee simple disposi-
tions and bequests and look more like life estate and conditional gift
dispositions. For example, testators may put restrictions on the use of
digital property into the future. The Uniform Law Commission Drafting
Committee should decide what types of additional dead-hand controls
can be applied to digital assets. The Committee must decide if the
FADAA will limit which types of use restrictions can be put on digital
assets or whether these decisions should be left for courts to decide on a
case-by-case basis. While it is impossible for a statute to address all the
possible ways that testators will try to devise their property, this author
argues that the FADAA should address the major options in as much
detail as possible and limit case-by-case determinations.
Use restrictions can take a variety of forms. Imagine a testator who
owns a domain name. Can the testator will the domain name to X for life
then to Y with the condition that the domain name be dormant during
the life estate? The testator ostensibly interferes with the economic value
of the domain name by ordering it to remain unused for years. The gift
to X is valueless to X. Once Y's interest in the domain name becomes
exercisable, he can benefit from the use or sale of the domain name. But
117. Id. at 94.
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Y's benefit is delayed. Domain names may have very little cultural or
sentimental value but have great monetary value. In 2001, the domain
name "hotels.com" was purchased for roughly $11 million.I"1 The presi-
dent of hotels.com called the purchase "a bargain.""' Thus, many digi-
tal assets have a value on the open market that varies greatly over time.
Delaying the sale of a domain name (or any other digital asset) could
mean losing hundreds to millions of dollars.
Another example of a problematic use restriction would be to will a
blog to a beneficiary and then restrict the type of content that can be
posted on the blog in the future. Professors Adam J. Hirsch and William
K.S. Wang argue that use restrictions on traditional types of property
lead to social costs, as they limit marketability and productive use of that
property. 12 0 They argue that use restrictions also lead to private costs
because "when a use restriction fails to correspond with the benefici-
ary's own consumption preferences, his utility falls."1 21
Courts have used a balancing test to determine what types of use
restrictions will be enforced using the following factors: "(i) the nature
of the property; (ii) the type of use restriction imposed; (iii) the testator's
purpose in imposing the restriction; and (iv) the likely impact of the
restriction on the heirs and society in general." 22 With the vast varieties
of digital assets, employing this balancing test in the digital world is
likely to lead to inconsistent holdings. Websites can disappear overnight
or change their policies at any moment, which can make characterizing
the nature of digital property difficult and the impact of the restriction on
heirs and society unpredictable. Therefore, this author argues that use
restrictions should be banned altogether for digital property. A judge
should be able to override this rule in only the most exceptional
circumstances.
CONCLUSION
Taking all of these concerns and consequences into consideration,
testators should be able to require tangible digital assets to be
bequeathed, in the online equivalent to fee simple, to any beneficiary or
group of beneficiaries. Testators can also require that any tangible digi-
tal asset, except for an asset of pure financial value or an online busi-
ness, be deleted or destroyed. Digital assets of pure financial value or
118. Interview by BBC Radio with David Roche, President, Hotels.com (Nov. 2, 2012),
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/today/hiltoday/newsid_9765000/9765923.stm.
119. Id.
120. Adam J. Hirsch & William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead Hand, 68 IND.
L.J. 1, 19-20 (1992).
121. Id.
122. Drennan, supra note 115, at 47.
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online businesses, such as stock or cash in any online account, cannot be
deleted because allowing otherwise would be a economic waste that is
not a justifiable expression of testamentary freedom. This author sug-
gests that the court's ability to override the deletion of any other digital
property be very limited.
No assets should be allowed to be willed with life estates, use
restrictions, or any other type of dead-hand restriction that interferes
with one or more persons taking complete dominion over a particular
asset. To allow otherwise would create enormous administrative
problems for executors, beneficiaries, and online service providers.
Complex ownership rights in digital property would be very difficult to
enforce. Life estates or will provisions prohibiting deletion of digital
property would add to the backlog of "digital junk" crowding the
Internet. This rule could be amended at a later time if Web-service pro-
viders create clearer property rights in online content and systems for
transferring ownership become easier to use. The current varieties of
terms of service agreements and the reasons for their language suggest
that clear user ownership is not desired or likely to occur.
Lastly, testators should be able to provide in their wills that their
executor has no authority to access their digital property, but that such a
provision can be overridden by court order. Complete bans of authority
should be overridden only to avoid waste of purely financial assets and
to handle disputes such as in the Davis v. Google case. Executors should
be able to petition a court for access to an asset such as to avoid liability
to an estate for libel or to liquidate cash kept online.
Certain digital property such as emails, websites, and domain
names are well-established concepts that can be specifically provided for
in the FADAA Draft. But the types of digital property owned on the
Internet will continue to expand over the next twenty years, and certain
concepts in the FADAA will need revision over time to include new
types of digital property. Just because dictionaries will have to add new
words in the future does not keep them from defining the words cur-
rently in existence.
Enforcing disposition choices with online service providers will be
difficult. Issues will inevitably arise in deciding where to draw the line
between destroyable and non-destroyable assets in close cases. Even
with all these concerns, creating a Uniform Law with detailed provisions
directing the disposition of digital property will move the conversation
in the right direction. Having a well-drafted and thoughtful Uniform
Law that states enact wholly or partially will be an authority for custodi-
ans to use to rethink their terms of service and better plan for the deaths
of their users. A Uniform Law will give estate planners and testators
much needed direction on how to lay their online selves to rest.
2014]1 559
